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INTENTIONAL WRONGFUL CONVICTION OF CHILDREN
VICTOR STREIB*
INTRODUCTION
Wrongful convictions' of adult criminal defendants almost always
stem from human error in the criminal justice system (CJS). Causes of
wrongful convictions within the CJS include mistaken reliance upon con-
fessions, informants, or eyewitnesses, misuse of evidence, overzealous
police and prosecutors, and incompetent or overworked defense attorneys.2
Very few adult cases appear to involve a judge who intentionally convicts
the defendant when the judge doesn't believe the defendant is actually
guilty. While we may understand and even be sympathetic to inadvertent
mistakes in our criminal processes, intentional wrongful conviction of a
criminal defendant is inexcusable. Further, proposed changes aimed at
reducing inadvertent mistakes cannot be expected to reduce intentional
acts.
Findings indicate that wrongful conviction of children may be a sig-
nificant problem in criminal court and juvenile court.3 Extrapolating be-
yond that research, it has been my experience that intentional wrongful
convictions occur with greater frequency in cases involving child offend-
* Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University; and Senior Lecturing Fellow, Duke Law School.
Research assistance provided by Jennifer Ruby, a second year law student at Elon University. This
article is based largely upon a paper presented at the Criminal Procedure Discussion Forum, Emory
University School of Law, Dec. 10, 2008.
1. The term "wrongful conviction" in this article uniformly means convicting a criminal defen-
dant or adjudicating a juvenile respondent for the offense charged without proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. The defendant or respondent may or may not have actually committed the offense, but in all
cases the proof offered by the state failed to meet the required burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, thus making the conviction violate the Due Process Clause. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
364-65 (1970).
2. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS'N, ACHIEVING JUSTICE: FREEING THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE
GUILTY, at xvi-xxviii (2006); DONALD A. DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE: THE ORIGINS,
DEVELOPMENT, AND FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 176-79 (2003); JIM DWYER
ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY
CONVICTED, at xv (2000); JOHN A. HUMPHREY & SAUNDRA D. WESTERVELT, Introduction to
WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 4-5 (Saundra D. Westervelt & John A.
Humphrey eds., 3d prtg. 2005) (2001); MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE:
ERRONEOUS CONVICTIONS IN CAPITAL CASES 17-18 (1992).
3. Steven A. Drizin & Greg Luloff, Are Juvenile Courts a Breeding Ground for Wrongful Con-
victions?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 257, 259-60 (2007).
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ers, whether processed in the CJS or in the juvenile justice system (JJS).
They may occur particularly in cases which the judge has insufficient evi-
dence proving any crime by the child but feels a strong need for the court to
intervene in the child's life and behavior.4 This may be wrongfully convict-
ing the child for the child's "own good," but it is nonetheless wrongful
conviction. While such intentional wrongful conviction may seem bizarre
and rare, it does happen. For example, two Pennsylvania judges convicted
and sentenced juveniles to confinement in privately run youth detention
centers in return for kickbacks from those centers.
5
The causes of wrongful convictions of children appear to be different
from those for adult offenders. Because this latter category has been so well
documented during the past decade, the list of major causes in adult cases
will be sketched first. The analysis then turns to the major causes of wrong-
ful convictions in children's cases, comparing and contrasting them with
those in adults' cases. The final section will begin to explore proposed
changes to policies and procedures that might reduce these wrongful con-
victions.
I. EXAMPLES AND ILLUSTRATIONS
Readers may believe that the title of this article posits cases so
unlikely to occur as to be unworthy of serious concern. However, they may
be drawn away from that position of denial by a combination of basic intui-
tion, several high-profile cases, and numerous reports in the literature.
Begin with your own memories as the long-suffering parent of a mis-
chievous child. You caught your child with a guilty look on his face and
with the expression of "the cat that ate the canary." However, you could
find little if any other evidence of the child's misbehavior. You knew your
child well and were quite versed in his past record of mischief, so you were
perfectly willing to assume he was guilty until proven innocent. You may
even have been willing to impose at least some form of punishment or dis-
cipline without any corroborating evidence of an offense, perhaps with the
logic that if he didn't do this he probably did lots of other things you never
discovered. Remember also that your child didn't have the "right to remain
4. Id. at 291 (some judges expect defense attorneys to act in the child's "best interest" rather than
be zealous advocates for the child).
5. Wendy N. Davis, Town Without Pity, 95 A.B.A. J. 50 (Sept. 2009); lan Urbina, 2 Ex-Judges
May Be Tried in Sentencing of Juveniles, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2009, at Al 1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/25/us/25judge.htnl; Ian Urbina & Sean D. Hamill, Judges Guilty in
Scheme to Jail Youths for Profit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, at A22, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/13/us/l 3judge.html.
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silent" when you asked him what he did. Indeed, remaining silent in the
face of stem parental questioning was an additional offense that aggravated
the primary offense. No one would suggest that he had a right to an attor-
ney present during your parental questioning.
Now assume that you are an officer of the CJS or JJS-law enforce-
ment, prosecution, defense, judicial, corrections, etc. The child offenders
who parade through your professional life seem to cry out for help, often
living in impossible situations by no fault of their own. You may see some
who have committed serious offenses. These children need and deserve
strong intervention by the CJS or the JJS. Yes, you could be wrong about
their guilt, but the evidence in their cases certainly meets the burden of
beyond a reasonable doubt.
But then there are the other cases, perhaps the younger siblings of the
primary offenders. The evidence of their involvements in the offenses is
much less convincing, to the point that you have substantial doubts about
their involvement at all. However, you convince yourself that those
younger siblings (a) live in the same impossible situation as their older
siblings and (b) will end up in the same serious situations unless things
change drastically for them.
Finally, you may see yourself as a surrogate parent or a big brother or
big sister as much as an officer of the CJS or JJS. Your overriding profes-
sional mission is to help children before it is too late, and these younger
children certainly need help. Sticking to legal formalities may hinder your
mission to help these children. You are convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that the child needs intervention in his life, even if you are far from
certain beyond a reasonable doubt that the child committed the offense as
charged.
What should you do in this child's case? Are you tempted to first pick
out the disposition that the child most needs and then backtrack to seek the
best path to get to that predetermined disposition?6 If so, you may be trou-
bled by the parallel to juries that seek to know what sentences are attached
to which crime alternatives so that they can tailor their guilty verdicts to
give the defendants before them the sentences such juries think would be
best. We may admonish these juries to focus only on the proof of the ele-
ments of the crime and not to jump ahead to sentencing alternatives. This
jumping ahead may be a particularly strong temptation in juvenile courts in
which singularly appropriate sanctions are available only to juvenile re-
6. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 5, at 53 (judge accused of learning about a child's alleged
"disrectful" acts prior to the fact-finding portion of the child's case and then using that information to
determine a disposition for the child).
2010]
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spondents who are adjudicated delinquent for a narrow range of juvenile
offenses. The option of finding the child not guilty apparently is almost
never chosen-virtually every child charged becomes a child adjudicated in
juvenile court. 7 Indeed, acquitting the child of the offenses charged and
thereby sending the child back to his home environment may be inconsis-
tent with the mission of helping children in need.
The JJS trial court scenario is far from typical, since the overwhelm-
ing percentage of children's cases are plea bargained and thereby avoid
adjudicatory hearings or trials. Of course, their guilty pleas must still be
accepted by the judge, so that may be the point at which the judge is
tempted to enter an intentionally wrongful conviction of the child because
it is the only means to the desired dispositional alternative. 8 Earlier in the
process, the prosecutor and defense attorney faced the same issue when
they worked out an agreement in which the child pleads guilty to offenses
he did not commit. Consider the parent who advises her child to enter such
an agreement, and to lie about the facts in order to get into a preferred pro-
gram.
The other, odder example of wrongful convictions of juveniles is
when they are imposed not for the children's own good but for the judges'
own good.9 The conduct of the Pennsylvania judges, who took kickbacks
for convicting juveniles and sending them to private correctional institu-
tions, may be unprecedented.' 0 Although denied by the judges in question,
many of these convictions may have been knowingly wrongful and at least
the sentences of incarceration were often unjustified."l At a minimum, the
judges had clear and irreconcilable conflicts of interest when imposing
such sentences.
Nonetheless, finding real world examples of intentional wrongful con-
victions is difficult. Even those JJS and CJS officials who do engage in
these actions appear to be reluctant to admit to them. Children's cases are
seldom reviewed thoroughly on appeal, so even egregious intentional
7. See BARRY C. FELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 829 (2d
ed. 2004) (2000) ("Because the juvenile court adjudicates virtually all juveniles against whom the state
files delinquency petitions delinquent, the dispositional decision becomes the crucial one in the proc-
ess.").
8. At least one judge stopped giving probation to juveniles arrested at school, preferring to place
them in various types of reform schools. See Davis, supra note 5, at 53.
9. Urbina, supra note 5, at All.
10. Urbina & Hamill, supra note 5, at A22 (Referring to the over 5000 juvenile cases that may
have been wrongfully decided, Special Master Senior Judge Arthur E. Grim stated "In my entire career,
I've never heard of anything remotely approaching this."); See generally In re Expungement of Juvenile
Records, No. 81 MM 2008, 2009 Pa. LEXIS 1695 (Pa. Aug. 7, 2009).
11. Urbina & Hamill, supra note 5, at A22; Expungement, 2009 Pa. LEXIS 1695, at *26.
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wrongful convictions of children are unlikely to be documented in appel-
late or post-conviction processes.12
II. PRIMARY CAUSES OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS IN ADULT CASES
The past decade or so has seen an explosion of research on the various
reasons why wrongful convictions occur. Some of these reasons are
counter-intuitive, such as defendants confessing to crimes they didn't
commit. 13 Others seem to stem from basic human nature, such as believing
sworn testimony from witnesses who "saw it with their own eyes."'14 Still
more result from overzealousness or negligence on the part of prosecutors
or defense attorneys. 15 Such errors obviously could occur in children's
cases as well as in adult's cases. However, intentional wrongful conviction
of children seems more likely than intentional wrongful conviction of
adults, at least if the primary motivator is doing what is best for the defen-
dant. The parens patriae approach of the JJS16 is not nearly as common in
the CJS.
Before we identify the causes of wrongful convictions of children and
juxtapose them with those for adults, we need to identify the latter. The
research literature on wrongful convictions in adult cases is voluminous,
and this is but a brief sketch of such a rich topic. If we look carefully
enough, however, we may find that some of these adult factors also apply
to children's cases. Our approach to them will be to tease out causal factors
of intentional wrongful convictions and to separate them from those that
are unintentional.
The misleading impact of false confessions can be enormous. 17 Why
would the defendant have confessed if he wasn't guilty? It is easy to imag-
12. BARRY C. FELD, JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION IN A NUTSHELL 316-17 (2d ed. 2009)
(2003) ("Even with expedited review, appeals by many delinquents may fail because their cases become
moot when dispositional orders expire or they are released from custody."); Davis, supra note 5, at 53-
54 ("While juveniles could have appealed [the juvenile court judge's] orders, the sentences were so
short that a successful appeal would prove meaningless.").
13. Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and
Irrational Action, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 979, 983 (1997).
14. Sandra Guerra Thompson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Reconsidering Uncorroborated
Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1487, 1489 (2008) (courts and laypersons
tend to believe the testimony of eyewitnesses).
15. See, e.g., HUMPHREY & WESTERVELT, supra note 2, at 5.
16. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967) (stating that historically, the government acting as parens
patriae, could deny due process rights to a child because children did not have a recognized right to
liberty).
17. Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA
World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 960 (2004)("[C]onfessions may be 'uniquely potent' relative to other
forms of (falsely) incriminating evidence in their ability to cause wrongful convictions.").
2010]
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ine this question resonating in the jury room during final deliberations.
Indeed, research has concluded that "placing a confession before a jury is
tantamount to an instruction to convict .... "18 However, this powerful
evidence can be false, leading to wrongful convictions. False confession
may be a leading cause in as many as one-fourth of all wrongful conviction
cases. 19
It also appears that coercive police interrogation is a primary source of
false confessions. 20 Of particular significance to our topic is that juvenile
suspects are particularly likely to provide false confessions during police
interrogation.2 1 If the child sees the police officer as an authority figure, the
pressure from parents to "tell the truth" may be translated by the child as
telling the police what they want to hear-namely a confession. 22 In a ma-
jor study of exonerations, nearly half of the juvenile cases involved false
confessions, and the younger the defendant, the greater likelihood of a false
confession. 2
3
Apparently the single most important factor in wrongful convictions is
eyewitness misidentification. 24 Such cases include those in which there is a
close resemblance between the actual offender and the innocent defendant,
and other where the accused person bears little if any resemblance to the
actual offender. The greatest margin of error appears to be with eyewitness
identification of a suspect previously unknown to the victim or witness.25
However, juries still tend to attach special importance to such identification
and see the testimony of eyewitnesses as quite convincing. 26 These eyewit-
ness identifications can be at the scene of the crime, at a pretrial lineup or
photo display, or in open court. Research indicates that the chance of error
is particularly high for cross-racial identifications. 27 One might posit that a
18. Ofshe & Leo, supra note 13, at 1118.
19. Drizin & Leo, supra note 17, at 902.
20. See, e.g., Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Depri-
vations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 429, 440 (1998) ("Interrogators sometimes become so committed to closing a case
that they improperly use psychological interrogation techniques to coerce or persuade a suspect into
giving a statement that allows the interrogator to make an arrest.").
21. Drizin & Leo, supra note 17, at 920.
22. See Drizin & Luloff, supra note 3, at 275 (under questioning from adult authority figures,
innocent children may feel pressured to falsely admit guilt).
23. Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 523, 545 (2005).
24. Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification: Psychological Research and Legal
Policy on Lineups, I PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 765, 765 (1995).
25. See Gross, et al., supra note 23, at 530 ("Eyewitness misidentification is almost entirely
restricted to crimes committed by strangers....
26. Thompson, supra note 14, at 1489.
27. Gross et al., supra note 23, at 551.
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case involving an older white suburban victim identifying a teenage black
inner-city suspect may particularly lead us astray.
In cases relying upon eyewitness identification, a jury or a judge
should consider all information related to the issue and should decide the
adequacy, validity, and reliability of the eyewitness identification in each
case. Police should make a special effort to conduct interviews of all eye-
witnesses and victims as soon as possible in order to minimize memory
distortion. No identification procedure (pre- or post-indictment) should be
conducted in the absence of the defendant's attorney. Moreover, courts
should permit the use of expert testimony on the reliability of witnesses,
and should instruct juries of the problem with inaccurate eyewitness testi-
mony.2
8
With the popularity of crime scene investigation (CSI) television
shows, current television fans and potential jurors may come to believe that
at least forensic science will not mislead us. However, research has found
that one-third of exonerations studied in a leading innocence project in-
volved "tainted or fraudulent science."' 29 Surprisingly, many cases of mis-
conduct, negligence and fraud in forensic laboratories have been
documented and exposed.30 Still, no significant factor relating to children's
cases is readily apparent. Indeed, the typical minor offenses peculiar to
juveniles would seldom provide evidence lending itself to analysis by fo-
rensic science.
The widespread and often unprincipled use of informants, or
"snitches," by police, prosecutors and jail officers is particularly problem-
atic. These are situations in which less than reliable witnesses provide in-
criminating information against a suspect in return for some payoff, either
in cash or in some desirable break in their own case. Such cases of paying
for information may well lead to fabricating that information. For example,
in the 1980s, defense lawyers identified 225 convictions based on poten-
tially improper use ofjailhouse informants and "snitches" at the Los Ange-
les County Jail.31 Also, almost half of the thirteen wrongfully convicted
Illinois death row inmates were prosecuted using evidence from jailhouse
28. See C. Ronald Huff, Wrongful Conviction: Causes and Public Policy Issues, 18 CRIM. JUST.,
Spring 2003, at 19; Bethany Shelton, Comment, Turning a Blind Eye to Justice: Kansas Courts Must
Integrate Scientific Research Regarding Eyewitness Testimony into the Courtroom, 56 U. KAN. L. REV.
949, 958-59 (2008).
29. DWYER ET AL., supra note 2, at 246.
30. AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 2, at xxi.
31. Huff, supra note 28, at 18; See also Robert Reinhold, California Shaken Over an Informer,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1989, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1989/02/17/us/califomia-
shaken-over-an-informer.html.
2010]
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informants. 32 Whether or not children's cases are overrepresented here is
not readily apparent.
Following the Supreme Court's lead, many CJS and JJS analysts have
come to stress the need for competent and effective counsel. 33 Powell v.
Alabama, a 1932 case about black teenagers accused of raping two white
girls, was the beginning of the now ubiquitous claims of inadequate de-
fense attorneys at trial.34 The inadequacy of some defense counsel in
criminal cases seems hard to deny.35 Some of this inadequacy stems simply
from having incompetent lawyers defending criminal cases.36 But even if
able criminal lawyers are appointed as public defenders, the back-breaking
work load of key public defender offices often leaves them unable to pro-
vide adequate legal counsel.37 Additionally, some unscrupulous defense
attorneys convince their clients to plead guilty without adequately investi-
gating these clients' cases. 38
Police investigations may initially focus on a prime suspect. From that
point on, human nature may lead the investigators to ignore contradicting
evidence and instead to pursue evidence that validates their premise.
39
Similarly, once prosecutors have formally charged a defendant with spe-
cific crimes, it would be professionally embarrassing to admit error and
dismiss those charges.40 Moving from these understandable and perhaps
benign behaviors, we also see instances in which the police or the prosecu-
tor engage in overzealous and unethical behaviors such as coaching wit-
nesses, fabricating or concealing evidence, and committing perjury in order
to convict the defendant. 41 The community seldom can be expected to pun-
32. Huff, supra note 28, at 18.
33. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-86 (1984); Stephen B. Bright, Counsel
for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime But for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J.
1835, 1883 (1994); Jeffrey Levinson, Note, Don't Let Sleeping Lawyers Lie: Raising the Standard for
Effective Assistance of Counsel, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 177-78 (2001).
34. 287 U.S. 45, 49, 51-52 (1932).
35. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Gideon's Reality: After Four Decades, Where Are We?, CRIM.
JUST., Summer 2003, at 5, 8.
36. Id. at 4-5.
37. Donna Leinwand, Public Defenders Refusing Cases; Offices Argue Cuts, Caseloads Threaten
Rights of Defendants, USA TODAY, Sept. 11, 2008, at IA.
38. Huff, supra note 28, at 17.
39. See HUMPHREY & WESTERVELT, supra note 2, at 10; DWYER, ET AL., supra note 2, at xvi.
40. For example, in the recent, high-profile ethics case against former Alaskan Senator Ted Ste-
vens, prosecutors apparently withheld vital information from defense counsel. Leading Justice Depart-
ment prosecutors were admonished by the judge, cited for contempt of court, and some resigned from
their Justice Department positions. See Signs of Prosecutorial Misconduct Appear in Ted Stevens Legal
Saga, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2009, at A16, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 123509358392428915.html.
41. See Leo & Ofshe, supra note 20, at 441.
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ish such "tough on crime" behavior, certainly where it errs on the side of
aggressive crime detection and prosecution.
Plea agreements produce a growing number of convictions in the
JJS.42 Given the sheer volume of these bargained convictions, at least some
of these convictions are likely to be erroneous. Nonetheless, these are de-
fendants who are wrongfully convicted after knowingly and intelligently
pleading guilty.43 Why would someone plead guilty to a crime he or she
did not commit? Some answers may come from the same sources as the
false confessions discussed earlier. However, many other defendants may
decide to plead guilty, even though they are innocent, in order to avoid the
possibility of even more severe consequences if they go to trial.
44
Even just one sensational crime may generate a community atmos-
phere of fear and paranoia, resulting in tremendous pressure on the police,
the prosecutor, and the courts to catch the "bad guy" and to remove him
from the community.4 5 Working under intense pressure and heightened
public scrutiny can increase the incidence of error, and that of course can
be true for officers of the CJS and JJS as well. If we arrest, prosecute and
convict the wrong person, however, the community is even less safe that it
was before. The real offender is still at large, and, since we already have
"solved" the case, no one is still out looking for that real offender. This
further motivates avoiding wrongful convictions and would seem to render
intentional wrongful convictions unforgivable.
When a crime with somewhat unusual characteristics occurs, the po-
lice may tend to "round up the usual suspects," at least figuratively. 4 6 That
is, they search for past suspects or offenders with possible involvement in
similar crimes, building on a premise that this may just be repeat behav-
ior.4 7 The problem is, of course, that this may lead the police to a likely but
innocent suspect and cause them to ignore evidence leading them in an-
other direction.4 8 The prosecutor may similarly be lead to file charges
against this likely suspect, based in part upon the logic that he has done this
sort of thing before. When the case comes before the court, it would not be
42. Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Plea Bargaining in Juvenile Court, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2008, at 61.
43. Drizin & Luloff, supra note 3, at 292.
44. Id.
45. See Drizin & Leo, supra note 17, at 946 ("[F]alse confessions tend to be concentrated in the
most serious and high profile cases, lending credence to the argument that false confessions... are
more likely to occur in the most serious cases because there is more pressure on the police to solve such
cases.").
46. See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1125-26 (2008) ("[P]olice
are prone to arrest recidivists on less concrete evidence....
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., HUMPHREY & WESTERVELT, supra note 2, at 5.
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unusual for the judge to know of the defendant's criminal record as well. 49
In fact, the only people directly involved in the case who usually don't
know of the defendant's past record are the members of the jury.
There is a good reason why we don't admit evidence of the defen-
dant's prior convictions before a jury at the guilt trial. We fear that the
jurors may just assume that if the defendant has done this kind of thing
before, then he is more likely to have done it again this time and thus
should be convicted. However, if the judge is the sole adjudicator of guilt,
as in almost all juvenile court cases, then the judge seldom will be able to
avoid encountering these pressures.
50
III. PRIMARY CAUSES OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS IN CHILDREN'S
CASES
Almost all of the causes listed above for adult's cases are leading to-
ward unintentional wrongful convictions, and almost all would apply
equally to children's cases. The issue of false confessions is particularly
problematic for children, and any child's confession to criminal offenses
should be verified carefully. 51 Eyewitness error may be more prominent in
children's cases, in that adults may see most children as dressing alike with
similar haircuts and demeanor, making distinguishing between them more
difficult. One fairly obvious point addresses the tendency of police depart-
ments to use high school yearbook photographs as mug shots for photo
displays for witnesses and victims. 52 Most of us can remember that our
high school pictures were not particularly accurate portrayals of how we
looked on a day-to-day basis.
Adequacy of defense counsel may be a particular problem in chil-
dren's cases. 53 One thematic problem is that juvenile court may be seen as
a training ground for beginning assistant public defenders. 54 If they do well
in this training period and after they gain experience, they will be "pro-
moted" to adult criminal court.55 They then will be replaced by a new wave
49. Drizin & Luloff, supra note 3, at 306.
50. Id.
51. FELD, supra note 12, at 108-111.
52. See, e.g., Dean v. Duckworth, 748 F.2d 367, 368 (7th Cir. 1984) (raped woman shown high
school yearbook photos in an attempt to identify her attackers).
53. See, e.g., Mary Berkheiser, The Fiction of Juvenile Right to Counsel: Waiver in the Juvenile
Courts, 54 FLA. L. REv. 577, 580 (2002); Ellen Marrus, Best Interests Equals Zealous Advocacy: A Not
So Radical View of Holistic Representation for Children Accused of Crime, 62 MD. L. REV. 288, 309
(2003).
54. See Marrus, supra note 53, at 348.
55. Id.
[Vol 85:1
INTENTIONAL WRONGFUL CONVICTION OF CHILDREN
of beginning assistant public defenders, insuring that children will continu-
ally receive the services of the least experience defense counsel. In addi-
tion, the huge caseloads for public defenders do not diminish when it
comes to juvenile cases.
56
But the role of juvenile defense attorney presents another unique twist
not found in adult cases. Many well-meaning observers would urge this
attorney to seek the "best interests of the child" rather than being a zealous
advocate for the child's rights. 57 Winning an acquittal, and thereby prevent-
ing the court from ordering the child to enter a much needed treatment
program, may be seen as undesirable for the child.
58
Plea agreements in adult criminal court generate almost all convic-
tions, perhaps as much as 90% or more.59 Given the pressure toward set-
tling a child's case "in the best interests of the child," a plea bargain may
offer the most efficient path to a desired treatment and corrections program
for the child. Serious questions as to whether the child is guilty as charged
may be seen simply as roadblocks to doing the right thing for the child.
Instead, we ask the child to lie in court when he pleads guilty. Do we forget
to ask what long term effect this perjury may have on that child's percep-
tion of fairness and justice in society?
The impact on children's cases that occurs when police react to com-
munity fear and paranoia about a high profile crime may be illustrated by
considering the Central Park Jogger case.60 There the police aggressively
investigated the shocking 1989 case of the woman jogger who was brutally
beaten, raped, and left for dead in New York City's Central Park.61 Five
children ages fourteen to sixteen had confessed to being at least accom-
plices to the rape and assault.62 All five children were subsequently con-
victed and sentenced to prison.63 Thirteen years later, the actual offender
confessed that he and he alone had raped and beaten the victim. 64 Analysis
of DNA found at the crime scene confirmed his statement.
65
56. See, e.g., Drizin & Luloff, supra note 3, at 290-91 (in some jurisdictions, juvenile defenders
have over 1000 cases per year).
57. Id. at 291-92.
58. Id.
59. Malvina Halberstam, Criminal Law: Towards Neutral Principles in the Administration of
Criminal Justice: A Critique of Supreme Court Decisions Sanctioning the Plea Bargaining Process, 73
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1,1 (1982).
60. See generally Sharon L. Davies, The Reality of False Confessions-Lessons of the Central
Park Jogger Case, 30 N.Y.U. REV. OF L. & SOC. CHANGE 209 (2006).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 211.
63. Id. at 212.




It seems generally accepted that the adjudicators of guilt or innocence
of an alleged offense do not know of any past offenses by the defendant. If
these adjudicators are members of the jury, we fear that they may just as-
sume that if the defendant has done this kind of thing before, then he is
more likely to have done it again this time and thus should be convicted.
However, many children's cases are processed in juvenile courts, where
juries are not required to sit.66 Thus, the case may be tried solely by the
juvenile court judge.67 Even if the trying judge doesn't have formal evi-
dence of the child's past offense record, certainly much less effort is made
to keep the judge from knowing that information. 68 In a small town, for
example, it would be likely that the juvenile court judge will know of the
child's past record or at least of his "reputation in the community." Indeed,
this judge may have had this child in court before.
The primary cause of the sentencing kickback scheme in Pennsylvania
was apparently one of the oldest temptations in public life, the lure of easy
money. Indeed, the two judges involved have pled guilty to federal charges
that they received more than $2.6 million.69 Political office-holders taking
kickbacks for favors while in office is sadly nothing new, and judges have
been known to take bribes for not convicting or sentencing clearly guilty
and deserving defendants. 70 In the Pennsylvania cases, however, the kick-
backs came from the corrections agents seeking more clients.71 Such a
setting is likely only when the corrections agency is private and receives
additional state payments for each additional client-a warden of a public
prison would not be motivated to bribe a judge to send more prisoners to
the already overcrowded public facility.
This list could go on and on, with different unique twists for each ju-
risdiction. The rules and procedures of juvenile court are less rigid than
those of adult criminal court,72 and taming juvenile courts to function under
the firm hand of In re Gault and its progeny continues to be a work in pro-
gress. However, there do seem to be some possible prescriptions that may
moderate the symptoms of wrongful juvenile conviction, even if they do
not cure the underlying disease.
66. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) ("[Tjrial by jury in the juvenile court's
adjudicative stage is not a constitutional requirement.") (plurality opinion).
67. See, e.g., Drizin & Luloff, supra note 3, at 302.
68. Id. at 305.
69. Urbina & Hamill, supra note 5, at A22.
70. Stratos Pahis, Corruption In Our Courts: What It Looks Like And Where It Is Hidden, 118
Yale L.J. 1900, 1926-27 (2009).
71. Davis, supra note 5, at 50.
72. See Irene Merker Rosenberg, The Rights of Delinquents in Juvenile Court: Why Not Equal
Protection?, 45 CRIM. L. BULL. (forthcoming Fall 2009).
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IV. REDUCING INTENTIONAL WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS OF CHILDREN
The above discussion has to some degree lumped together wrongful
convictions both of adults and of children, only occasionally specifying
which wrongful convictions may be unintentional and which may be inten-
tional. Parsing through this discussion, however, gives the impression that
intentional wrongful convictions are more common for children than for
adults. Building from that premise, this section more clearly identifies
those odd actions and searches for means to reduce their occurrence and
impact. The following suggestions are presented and analyzed in order of
importance to this question.
Arguably the most significant cause of intentional wrongful convic-
tions of children is that their defense attorneys are not zealously advocating
for dismissal, acquittal or minimally intrusive sentencing. 73 In contrast,
these attorneys may adopt the posture of seeking the best interests of their
child clients and have convinced themselves that adjudications or convic-
tions, commonly through plea agreements, are the most efficient means of
achieving those goals.74 Far from zealously advocating for their clients and
against the state's prosecution, they cooperate with the state in shunting the
child off to the desired program.
75
The cure for this problem may be challenging. It seems likely that
these defense attorneys are perfectly capable advocates and have been
trained in the law of criminal procedure, evidence, and trial advocacy.
Their "ineffectiveness" is probably not in preparation or skill but in their
goal. In some cases, they may seek an end result for their clients that others
might reject, that end result being adjudication as a delinquent or convic-
tion as a criminal. They probably believe that the negative factors attached
to such a status are worth suffering if the child gains can benefit from cor-
rective custody of the state. This orientation must be changed.
A second cause of intentional wrongful conviction of children is the
strong tradition of denying jury trials in juvenile court and leaving both the
question of guilt and sentence solely to the judge.76 While juvenile court
judges may rise up in condescending protest at any assertion of their inten-
tional error, they might sometimes "guide" the case to a particular out-
come. 77 They may take great pride in their parental approach to judging,
73. See Drizin & Luloff, supra note 3, at 290.
74. Id. at 291-92.
75. Marrus, supra note 53, at 290-91.
76. See, e.g., Drizin & Luloff, supra note 3, at 302.
77. Id. at 291.
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and they might resist turning over even a part of their essentially unchecked
power to a jury. Juvenile court judges might argue that their intimate
knowledge of the child's background and previous record is of great assis-
tance to them in finding the best result for the child. At the same time, they
would agree that a jury would never be given that information during a
trial.
The solution here is one arrived at by a growing number of jurisdic-
tions-provide for jury trials in juvenile court. 78 In some situations, there
may be no practical way to keep the judge from knowing of the child's past
record. 79 The only way to address this fundamental injustice is to turn the
adjudication over to a lay jury as we do in criminal cases. We could expect
a jury to take seriously their charge to decide solely whether or not the
child committed the alleged offense and not to bother themselves with the
resulting sentence options. If nothing else, wrongful convictions from a
jury presumably would not be intentional.
A closely associated factor to the judge-or-jury issue is taking seri-
ously the requirement that children's offenses be proven beyond a reason-
able doubt.80 This is the highest burden of proof known to American law,
and satisfying this burden should be a considerable undertaking. It seems at
least plausible that a jury solemnly instructed by their judge concerning this
lofty burden of proof might take it quite seriously. They might be expected
to return a verdict of not guilty even in cases in which they thought the
defendant was probably guilty but they had at least a reasonable doubt.
That result is what the United States Supreme Court anticipated when it
decided Winship,81 and we should seek means to better insure that it is
maintained.
Reducing the instances in which judges and other officers of the CJS
and JJS take bribes and kickbacks is a laudable goal but it is neither new
nor particularly a problem for children as defendants and respondents. In
contrast, one can more easily imagine the wealthy adult criminal defendant
who tempts with tainted funds than the street delinquent who almost never
would have access to funds, tainted or otherwise. However, the Pennsyl-
vania scandal serves to remind us that judges may be uniquely vulnerable
to bribes and kickbacks from private correctional facilities.
78. See, e.g., In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164, 172 (Kan. 2008) (finding that the Kansas Constitution
provides juveniles with the right to a jury trial).
79. See, e.g., Drizin & Luloff, supra note 3, at 306 (for example, the judge may have presided
over the child in court previously).
80. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
81. Id. at 363-64.
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The final two factors are also related to each other. One is that some
jurisdictions may limit access to the most desirable programs for children
to those adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court or convicted in criminal
court. 82 Simply being found to be a status offender or a child in need of
services might not be sufficient for admission. 83 This might tempt a judge
to intentionally wrongly convict a child as a justifiable means to that desir-
able end. It would seem that we could find ways to revise the appropriate
statutes to assure appropriate dispositions are available even if not con-
victed or adjudicated.
The related issue is that we have too many negative collateral effects
from juvenile adjudication and conviction. Perhaps wrongful convictions,
even intentional wrongful convictions, wouldn't be so objectionable if
there were no serious consequences from those convictions. An overarch-
ing inquiry should be what societal interests those negative consequences
serve, and if they outweigh the best interests of the child.
Finally, imagine the impact on children who are the subject of inten-
tional wrongful convictions. Presumably major goals of both the criminal
and juvenile justice systems are to impress upon children the majesty of the
law and the key roles that truth and justice play in those processes. Might
these children leave the courts even less respectful of the law than they
were when they entered?
82. See generally, FELD, supra note 12, at 378-382.
83. Id. at 380 ("Deinstitutionalization restricted juvenile courts' options to place status offenders
and reduced their authority to enforce dispositional orders. If states could not confine status offenders in
secure facilities, then it became more difficult to prevent them from running away from nonsecure
placements.").
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